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No. 90-194
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1991
John K. Yee and Irene Yee, et al.
Petitioners,
V.
The City of Escondido,
Respondent.
On Writ of Certiorari to the
Fourth Appellate District, Division One,
Court of Appeal for the State of California
BRIEF OF GOLDEN STATE MOBILHOME OWNERS LEAGUE,
INC., NATIONAL FOUNDATION OF MANUFACTURED
HOMEOWNERS, AND DESIGNATED MOBILEHOME
OWNERS ASSOCIATIONS AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT
OF RESPONDENT
Amici Curiae submit this brief with the written consent of all parties
filed with the Clerk of the Court.
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
Amici curiae are eleven state mobilehome owner associations and
the national organization of mobilehome owners. The membership of
each association is substantial. The Golden State Mobilhome Owners
League, Inc., for example, is a nonprofit California corporation of some
200,000 persons living in nearly 100,000 mobilehomes throughout Cali-
fornia. Amici's members live in mobilehome parks and pay monthly rent
to the park owner for the space on which their home resides.
Amici curiae have a substantial interest in the continuing ability of
local governments to enact ordinances that protect their property interest
in their home. A large percentage of amici's homeowner members are
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retired Americans on fixed incomes or low and moderate income families
for whom the mobilehome is the only feasible means of home ownership.
The members of the amici organizations have made a substantial invest-
ment in their homes and in improvements to the space on which their
homes are located. This investment can be rendered worthless if peti-
tioners' effort to invalidate Escondido's Rent Protection Ordinance is
successful.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Petitioners' challenge to Escondido's Rent Protection Ordinance
("Ordinance") implicates far more than a single municipality's effort to
control rents in mobilehome parks: it challenges the entire body of Cali-
fornia State law that has developed in response to the economic and tech-
nological innovation of the mobilehome.
The modem factory-built home that can be transported to a small
site and permanently installed, without all the infrastructure of a conven-
tional single family home, is a technological and economic breakthrough
in the provision of affordable owner-occupied housing. "[T]he mobile
home must be regarded as a genuine innovation, meeting needs which
conventional housing has left unsatisfied."' Indeed, it has been called a
"Revolution in American Housing";2 mobilehomes are the only kind of
housing that many moderate-income American families can reasonably
afford.3
There is no traditional property rule to govern the "genuine innova-
tion" of the modem mobilehome. Unlike a conventional tenant's fixtures
or a commercial tenant's improvements, it is a distinctively American
innovation linked to the American dream of home ownership. In actual
operation, the economics of this new type of housing required a legally
innovative split estate where one party owned the dwelling and another
owned the underlying land. This form of property ownership gave park
owners considerable economic power over mobilehome owners and
posed questions that had not previously presented themselves in the set-
ting of modem home ownership.
The novelty of such separate ownership required the state to exer-
cise its authority to define the respective rights of the co-proprietors.
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972);
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1877). That is exactly what the State
of California ("State") did over a period of several decades by enacting
1. Wallis, Wheel Estate (1991) at 20.
2. Drury, Mobile Homes, The Unrecognized Revolution in American Housing (1972).
3. Wallis, supra note I at 14.
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numerous laws to protect mobilehome owners' equity investment in their
homes.4 Those laws, which define the property rights of park owners and
homeowners in mobilehome parks, recognize the homeowners' entitle-
ment to a property interest that reflects the price the home would sell for,
with security of tenure in its location.
In turn, the State found that the park owners' economic power to
deprive homeowners of their equity in their homes resulted from the lim-
ited supply of mobilehome spaces and the homeowners' "sunk" invest-
ment on-site, and was not a protectable property interest. The State's
definition of the respective property rights of the mobilehome owners and
park owners was well within its authority to define property rights in a
new situation so long as it did not unreasonably impair the park owner's
use of its property. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 73,
83 (1980). Escondido's Ordinance, like that in jurisdictions throughout
California and the United States, implements these state laws in a form
that they explicitly authorize.5
Petitioners claim that the Escondido law results in a physical taking
of their property because it transfers a possessory interest of the park
owner (the right to occupy the property in its park at below market
rates) to the homeowner and it allows the homeowner to market this
interest. Specifically, petitioners challenge the provisions of the Escon-
dido Ordinance that preclude park owners from automatically raising
rents whenever a mobilehome is sold in place. Petitioners also allege this
provision violates their right to substantive due process because it is not
rationally related to a legitimate government interest.
Properly framed, this is a definition of property case, not a taking
case. The appropriate starting point for resolving this property dispute is
to ask whether California, when faced with this new form of property
ownership, had the authority to protect the equity investment of
mobilehome owners by allowing them to sell their home with security of
tenure in its location. The second issue that this Court must address
then, is whether Escondido's Ordinance is consistent with the State's def-
inition of those property rights. Amici respectfully submit that the Court
should answer both questions in the affirmative and uphold the constitu-
tionality of the Escondido Ordinance.
4. California law governing mobilehomes is codified in California Civil Code section 798
et seq. (West 1983 and Supp. 1991).
5. Cal. Civ. Code section 798.17(a) allows a mobilehome owner to demand a rent-con-
trolled tenure of twelve months or less whenever a local government adopts an ordinance or
initiative measure establishing a maximum amount that a park owner may charge a
mobilehome owner for rent.
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ARGUMENT
I. THE TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION OF THE
MOBILEHOME REQUIRED THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
TO DEFINE THE RESPECTIVE RIGHTS OF THE PARK
OWNER AND THE MOBILEHOME OWNER AS CO-
PROPRIETORS IN THIS UNIQUE FORM OF HOME
OWNERSHIP.
A. California Has the Authority To Define the Mobilehome Owners'
Estate in Their Homes.
New forms of ownership, new technologies, and new economic and
material conditions in a state generate changes in the rules of real prop-
erty law. The principle is as old as the Union; in the Eighteenth Century
"some of our states quickly took advantage of their newly acquired inde-
pendence to abolish all feudal tenures by legislative flat."6 "In a chang-
ing world, it is impossible that it should be otherwise." Village of Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926) (zoning not a violation of
property rights).
States have power to enact laws that respond to technological and
economic changes. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. at 134. "Property interests,
of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created
and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that
stem from an independent source such as state law.... ." Board of Re-
gents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. The State is not com-
pelled to leave the parties to whatever physical or economic power one
has over the other, or to leave them to whatever they can obtain by
contract. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 392 (1937).
The state's power to define property interests is not unlimited. It
may not "unreasonably impair" an owner's use of his property,
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. at 83, intrude on the
"sphere of private autonomy," id. at 93 (concurring opinion), or simply
abrogate common law remedies. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environ-
mental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 88 (1978). Nor may the state simply
transform private property into public property. Webb's Fabulous Phar-
macies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980) (declaring invalid the
transfer of interest on private interpleader funds to public accounts). So
long as it respects these precepts and does not, in the absence of changed
circumstances, reverse a "usual and general rule" of property, the state is
and must be free to adapt to new circumstances.
There are numerous examples throughout our history of legislative
6. Vance, "The Quest for Tenure in the United States," 33 Yale _. 248, 249 (1924).
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and judicial responses to technological and economic innovations. Thus,
the invention of the airplane led to a change in the common law defini-
tion of property through recognition of navigable airspace. United States
v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260-61 (1946). Modem timber harvesting di-
minished riparian rights and created a public right of passage by develop-
ing the floating log test of navigability in place of the common law rule
that only ship traffic demonstrated navigability. Lancy v. Clifford, 54
Me. 487, 491 (1867). The modem company town and the contemporary
shopping center brought modifications in the law of trespass. Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (access to company town); State v. Shack,
58 N.J. 297, 277 A.2d 369 (1971) (access to migratory farm workers on
employer's land); PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. at 82
(political soliciting in shopping center).
The new and unique form of property ownership created by the
modem mobilehome presented the State of California and its local gov-
ernments with a circumstance they had never before encountered. The
economic necessities of low cost homeownership required that a
mobilehome be sited on land owned by another, where it did not have
security of tenure. Park owners, because of this split estate, the limited
supply of mobilehome spaces, and the homeowners' "sunk" investment
on-site, obtained a controlling economic power over the equity of
mobilehome owners in their home.
The property interest that petitioners claim was taken by the Escon-
dido Ordinance is the product of the park owner's economic power over
homeowners. That power grows out of immobility, not out of the natu-
ral force of supply and demand, and is thus a species of monopoly after
the fact. The interest claimed by the park owners represents their power
to deprive mobilehome owners of their equity investment in their homes;
it is not a constitutionally protected property right. Since the beginning
of the modem mobilehome era and the emergence of the split estate,
California, like other states in this country where mobilehomes comprise
a significant portion of the affordable housing stock, has determined that
the right of sale with security of tenure in its location resides in the
homeowner."7 Because the park owners never possessed the interest they
now claim, the Escondido Ordinance has taken nothing from petitioners.
7. See infra note 57, and accompanying text.
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B. The State Has Responded to the Peculiarities of the Mobilehome
Market by Allocating Important Property Rights to the
Homeowners.
1. Mobilehomes Are the Predominant Form of Unsubsidized Af-
fordable Housing in the United States.
Nothing illuminates the conflict in this case better than the phrase
petitioners have chosen to describe the mobilehome: They call it "depre-
ciable personal property." (Brief for Petitioners (hereinafter "Brief"), at
28.) For 12.5 million Americans, a mobilehome is their dwelling; for
people of modest means, old and young, a mobilehome is the only home
they can hope to own.8 Manufactured housing accounted for almost 36
percent of all single-family homes sold in the United States in 1981, and
for the vast majority of those sold for under $50,000.1 Older Americans
on fixed incomes and more than 80 percent of young households who do
not own a home already can only afford to buy a mobilehome. 10
For young and old, home ownership with an equity interest is
strongly desired. The rental apartment is not a satisfactory alternative
because it meets none of the four basic norms of Americans' housing
preferences: ownership, detached dwelling, private outdoor space, and
conventional construction.II In contrast, the mobilehome meets three of
those criteria. Not surprisingly, therefore, rental apartments and owner-
occupied mobilehomes are distinct markets.
Contrary to petitioners' assertions, the modem mobilehome is not a
depreciating asset. The average mobilehome, like the average site-built
home, retains its value over decades. It is a dwelling that is maintained,
improved, and cared for just like conventional site-built homes and that
"appreciate[s] in value when properly located, maintained, and cared
for.""2 The only difference is that the owners are on average less affluent,
8. A study by the California Department of Housing and Community Development
("HCD") estimates that families earning only 50 to 80 percent of the median income in their
area could afford to buy a mobilehome. HCD, Incentives for New Family Mobilehome Parks in
California (hereinafter "Incentives") (1986) at 6.
9. Baar, "The Right to Sell the 'Im'mobile Manufactured Home in its Rent Controlled
Space in the 'Im'mobile Home Park: Valid Regulation or Unconstitutional Taking?," 24 Ur-
ban Lawyer No. 2 (forthcoming Winter 1992), citing Report of the President's Commission on
Housing (1982) at 85-86.
10. Nutt-Powell, Manufactured Homes (1982) at 67. In Escondido, a mobilehome on-site
costs about one-third to one-quarter of the price of a conventional site-built home. Compare
sales data from Berlin Research Corporation, Mobile Home Sales Report (1991) to "Southland
Home Prices for San Diego County," Los Angeles Times (November 17, 1991).
11. Tremblay & Dillman, Beyond the American Housing Dream: Accommodation to the
1980's (1983) at 14.
12. "Better Way to Appraise Mobile Homes," Banking (October 1978) at 118.
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often because they are retired and living on pensions. The average age of
mobilehome owners in Escondido is 64.4 years.13 In 1988 the median
family income of Escondido mobilehome owners was $15,500.14
Modem mobilehomes, many as large as 1400 square feet,' 5 cost tens
of thousands of dollars retail and homeowners invest thousands more in
improvements and landscaping, as well as placement on their site. In
1988 the average retail cost of a double-wide mobilehome in California
was $40,000.16 Purchasers buy and move into well-maintained homes
that are often well over twenty years old, going back to the beginning of
the era of the modern, larger mobilehomes.1
7
The single example cited by Judge Kozinski in Azul Pacifico, Inc. v.
Los Angeles, - F.2d -, - (9th Cir. 1991), 91 Daily Journal D.A.R.
13599 (1991), and repeatedly cited by petitioners (Brief, at 10, 14, 20) of
an individual who bought a mobilehome on-site and scrapped it, is a
highly unusual situation. As with site-built homes, the overwhelming
majority of mobilehomes are bought to be lived in, and the sellers have a
substantial equity investment to protect. By isolating the extremely atyp-
ical case of "one Mrs. Morrison," the opinion in Azul Pacifico suggests
that the home itself is worthless. Exactly the opposite is the case. Al-
most all mobilehomes are sold in place as sound dwellings to buyers who
will live in them.' 8
Mobilehome prices appreciate in states even without rent control. HCD, Manufactured Hous-
ing for Families: Innovative Land Use and Design (hereinafter "Manufactured Housing for
Families")(1986) at 13-15 showing rapid appreciation of mobilehome prices in Arizona even
though the state preempts rent control; see Az. Stat. Ch. 11 § 33-1416 (West 1990).
13. San Diego Association of Governments, City of Escondido Mobile Home Needs Survey
(1988) at 5.
14. Id. By comparison, the 1990 median income for all households in the San Diego area
was $37,900. San Diego Association of Governments, City of San Diego Mobile Home Needs
Survey (hereinafter "San Diego Mobile Home Needs Survey") (1990) at 9.
15. Anderman, The Manufactured Housing Alterative (1981) at 13; San Diego Mobile
Home Needs Survey, supra note 14 at 14.
16. Manufactured Housing for Families, supra note 12 at 7-8. This amount does not in-
clude transportation and setting on site.
17. Recent published sales figures for Escondido show many transfers of mobilehomes that
were built in the early to mid-1960's, and many more that date to the early 1970's. Berlin
Research Corporation, supra note 10.
18. HCD, Mobilehome Parks in California (1986) at 19, stating that more than 90 percent
of mobilehomes that are sold remain in the park.
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2. Mobilehome Owners Are Uniquely Vulnerable to Losing the In-
vestment in Their Home.
a. The Mobilehome Owners' Substantial Investment in Their
Homes and Scarcity of Alternative Locations Limit Their
Options.
Mobilehome owners are in a unique, and uniquely vulnerable, posi-
tion. They cannot pack up and leave when rents rise. Their homes sit on
land owned by someone else-a pervasive necessity of the economics of
the mobilehome as affordable housing. Even if vacant spaces were avail-
able (there are virtually none in much of California),19 the cost of moving
a sizeable mobilehome is between $10,000 and $12,000.20 A mobilehome
thus has considerably more value if it can remain on-site than if it must
be moved elsewhere. This fact permits the "opportunistic behavior" that
is created whenever one party is obliged by circumstances to make an
immobile capital investment on the land of another.21 This power may
be called opportunistic monopoly, or monopoly after the fact. Once the
mobilehome is installed on its pad, the unprotected homeowner will sub-
mit to above-market rents simply to avoid the cost of moving. The park
owner's power to capture for himself those sunk investment costs is an
undeserved windfall called "quasi rent." Even Hirsch & Hirsch speak of
this monopoly profit potential as a "hold up" of the incumbent
mobilehome owner.22
Scarcity increases the mobilehome owner's vulnerability. The vir-
tual absence of vacant pads means the homeowner has nowhere to move.
He is thus vulnerable not only to loss of moving costs, but to the entire
equity in his home if he has no entitlement to security of tenure for him-
self or for a successor in his location. If there were no scarcity, the
mobilehome owner could move and at least protect his investment, mi-
nus the cost of moving. But where there are no vacant sites available,
scarcity permits a park owner to drive the home's price down to salvage,
ordinarily only a few thousand dollars.23 What usually is a source of
appreciation becomes, for the mobilehome dweller, a trap.
19. Pad vacancies are about 3 percent state wide and near zero in many California commu-
nities. Mobilehome Parks in California, supra note 18 at 17.
20. Wallis, supra note 1 at 15.
21. 0. Williamson, Market and Hierarchies: Analysis and Anti-Trust Implications (1975).
22. Hirsch and Hirsch, "Legal-Economic Analysis of Rent Controls in a Mobile Home
Context: Placement Values and Vacancy Decontrol," 35 UC.L.A. L. Rev., 389, 436 (1988).
23. Note: "Mobile Home Parks and Connecticut's Regulatory Scheme; A Takings Analy-
sis" (hereinafter "Mobile Home Parks and Connecticut's Regulatory Scheme"), 17 Conn. L.
Rev. 811, 815 and n.19 (1985).
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b. Rent Control Is a Response to Scarcity; It Is Not
Responsible for Scarcity.
Rent control did not create scarcity in the mobilehome market; it
was a response to scarcity largely created by restrictive zoning and the
landowner power it generated. "As urban areas grew, [cities] annexed
the parks along with everything else . . . the only land zoned for
[mobilehome parks] was often what they already occupied."124
Although total exclusion is often barred by legislation and the courts,
new laws permitting mobilehomes to be placed on land zoned for resi-
dential use produce virtually no results, as land prices are too high to
make the use of such large tracts economical.25
Scarcity persists because other, higher density uses are more profita-
ble than mobilehome parks, whether or not there is rent control.26 For
example, if controlled rents limit return to 8 percent, while uncontrolled
rents would produce a 12 percent return, profit maximizing landowners
will still reject mobilehome parks in favor of high rise apartments or
office buildings which can produce a 15 percent return. Where land
prices are high, mobilehomes are unlikely to be built.27 For that reason,
few new mobilehome parks are being built in Southern California and it
is unlikely that new mobilehome parks will be built on any land in Es-
condido. 28 The decline in the number of new mobilehome parks in Cali-
fornia over the last several decades is attributable fundamentally to
increased demand for high density uses, not to rent control.
24. Wallis, supra note 1 at 16; see also "Manufactured Housing: The Invalidity of the
'Mobility' Standard," 19 The Urban Lawyer 367 (1987).
25. HCD, Local Government Mobilehome and Mobilehome Park Policies in California
(hereinafter "Local Government Policies") (1986) at 13; Comment: "California Government
Code Section 65852.3: Legislature Prohibits Exclusion of Mobile Homes on Single-Family
Lots," 16 U.C.D.L Rev. 167 (1982).
26. Rent control was cited in a survey of local governments in California as the reason for
not submitting a mobilehome park development application in only one percent of the cases.
Lack of suitable land, costs, economics, and poor demand were dominant considerations. Lo-
cal Government Policies, supra note 25 at 31.
27. "New parks must compete against higher intensity alternatives." Incentives, supra
note 8 at 17. Where county land prices are high, the distribution of mobile home parks is low.
State of New Jersey Legislative Study Commission, Report and Recommendations of the Mo-
bile Home Study Commission (October 1980) at 93.
28. Escondido already has 31 mobilehome parks, and while homeowners may place
mobilehomes on individual lots, none of the vacant residential property is zoned for
mobilehome parks.
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c. In the Absence of Regulation, Park Owners Have Exercised
Their Substantial Economic Power To Drive Mobilehome
Prices Down, Leaving the Homeowner With a Worthless
Investment.
The history of park owner abuses of their economic power over
mobilehome owners has been documented over the years. 29  For exam-
ple, park owners charged entrance and exit fees, required homeowners
to buy their homes from the parkowner or a specified dealer, and rejected
new tenants without the payment of a fee.30
Park prohibitions of on-site sales allowed park owners to evict cur-
rent homeowners and collect entrance fees from incoming homeown-
ers-with disastrous consequences for the evicted homeowners.
[T]he evicted homeowner must not only move himself but must
also move his home. The owner, in effect, faces the options of
abandoning the home, attempting to sell it, or moving it into
storage until a new pad is obtained. All of these options may
destroy the homeowner's equity in his unit . . . [T]he
mobilehome park owner may have strong incentives to evict his
tenants whenever possible.31
Exemptions from this prohibition could be purchased, with prices-even
in 1973-varying between $250 and $2,700.32
The legislative staff analysis for the 1973 California bill that prohib-
ited forced removal of mobilehomes upon sale noted:
it is alleged that the management often obtains a very large
commission for directing purchasers to the tenant, which the
tenant must pay if he wants the new purchaser to be able to
move into the park.33
29. Manheim, "Tenant Eviction Protection and the Takings Clause," 1989 Wisc. L. Rev.
925, 965, n. 224; "Mobile Home Parks and Connecticut's Regulatory Scheme," supra note 23 at
815-816; Ware v. Trailer Mart, Inc., 623 F.2d 1150 (6th Cir. 1980) (requiring purchase of
mobilehome from park owner is violation of Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15);
Sherman v. Mertz, 42 Cal. App. 3d 769 (1974) (kickbacks on profits from sale of mobilehomes
a restraint of trade).
30. "Tyranny in Mobile-home Land," Consumer Reports (July 1973) at 441. See also Sub-
urban Mobile Homes v. AMFAC Communities, 101 Cal. App. 3d 532 (1980) (requirement that
mobilehomes could only be purchased from specified dealers violated California's anti.trust
laws).
31. Vernon, Note: "Mobilehomes: Present Regulation and Needed Reform," 27 Stanford
LRev. 159, 167 (1974).
32. "Tyranny In Mobile-home Land," supra note 30 at 441.
33. Senate Local Government Committee, Staff Analysis, Assembly Bill 702, Wilson
(amended August 14, 1973).
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These abuses allowed park owners to monetize their power over
homeowners.
H. STATE LAW PROTECTS THE PROPERTY INTERESTS OF
MOBILEHOME OWNERS FROM SIGNIFICANT DIMINU-
TION BY PARK OWNERS.
A. The Mobilehome Owner as Co-Proprietor, Not Ordinary
Tenant.
For more than twenty years the State of California has been legislat-
ing to "protect the investment of mobilehome owners" against abuses of
economic power by park owners.34 Owners of mobilehomes, as co-pro-
prietors with a large capital investment, were found to be needful of
"unique protection" both during their tenure and upon sale. 5 The legis-
lature formalized its treatment of the mobilehome owner's co-proprietor-
ship by explicitly substituting the term "homeowner" for the word
"tenant" in the mobilehome residency law.
36
The first problem to which the legislature attended was the practice
of evicting homeowners to install someone who had bought a
mobilehome from the park owner. In 1969 legislation imposed notice
requirements on eviction37 and two years later prohibited eviction for the
purpose of making a space available for a homeowner who purchased the
home from the owner of the park.38
Although they lost the power to evict in order to install their own
buyer, park owners could achieve the same economic benefits by impos-
ing charges on mobilehome sellers and their buyers.39 In 1972 the State
blocked this stratagem by prohibiting entry charges on new homeowners
and transfer charges as a condition of sale by incumbent homeowners.'
A year later the law extended the protections against eviction by prohib-
iting termination of the tenancy of incumbent homeowners except for
cause."1 During the same year, the legislature barred park owners from
requiring mobilehomes to be removed upon sale, another device by
34. Press Release dated May 17, 1973 by Assemblyman Bob Wilson, sponsor of the origi-
nal law now codified at Cal. Civ. Code § 798.73, 1973 Cal. Stat. ch. 785, § 1. (In each of the
ensuing statutory references, the current codified version may be somewhat different from the
original law.)
35. 1975 Cal. Stat. ch. 146, § 1, now codified at Cal. Civ. Code § 798.55.
36. California Civil Code §§ 798.8 and 798.9.
37. 1969 Cal. Stat. cl. 1500, § 1, codified at Cal. Civ. Code § 798.55(b).
38. 1971 Cal. Stat. ch. 1143, § 1, codified at Cal. Civ. Code § 798.58.
39. See supra notes 29 to 33 and accompanying text.
40. 1972 Cal. Stat. ch. 1001, § 1, codified at Cal. Civ. Code § 798.72.
41. 1973 Cal. Stat. ch. 351, § l(d), codified at Cal. Civ. Code § 798.56.
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which the park owner could have devalued the home of incumbent
homeowners.42 A legislative staff report explaining the 1973 bill noted:
A second issue is past abuse of park operators who have exer-
cised almost complete control over the sites and even what
dealer would sell the mobilehome to be installed in the park.
Because of few parks in only a few communities, operators
[park owners] would require purchase from a specific dealer,
and that they have exclusive right to control resale. They
charged excessive fees and frequently did little to market the
home. Homeowners took a bath on resale.43
In 1975 the legislature assured a qualified purchaser the right to take
over the pad on which the home was sited. Despite all the laws previ-
ously enacted, if the park owners could nonetheless refuse tenancy to all
purchasers, they would still be able to compel a sale to themselves or on
terms that would make the mobilehome unsalable to anyone else. With-
out protection against rejection of purchasers, park owners could circum-
vent all the State laws enacted to protect the homeowner's investment in
his mobilehome.
The law had previously provided that park owners had "the right to
require prior approval of a purchaser if the mobilehome will remain lo-
cated in the mobilehome park or other facility."' In the law of June 28,
1975, the legislature added this crucial passage:
... provided, however, that the approval of a purchaser cannot
be withheld if the purchaser as a prospective tenant has the fi-
nancial ability to pay the rent and charges of the park .... 45
With this provision, the State recognized definitively the property
right of an incumbent homeowner to sell his home with security of ten-
ure in its location. Implicit in the State's action is its refusal to elevate
the economic power of park owners to the status of a protected property
interest.46
California law recognizes the centrality of homeowner commitment
to value in those things that determine neighborhood and locational
quality, including investment in improvements and upkeep, maintenance
42. 1973 Cal. Stat. ch. 785, § 1, codified at Cal. Civ. Code § 798.73.
43. Urban Development & Housing Committee, Memo on AB 702, Wilson (May 15,
1973).
44. 1973 Cal. Stat. ch. 785, § 1, codified at Cal. Civ. Code § 798.74.
45. 1975 Cal. Stat. ch. 146, § 3, codified at Cal. Civ. Code § 798.74.
46. California, in recognition of the unequal bargaining power of the mobilehome owner
and park owner, prohibits the waiver of its mobilehome owner protection laws. Cal. Civ. Code
§§ 798.19, 798.77.
[Vol. 25:1259
YEE V CITY OF ESCONDIDO
of structures, landscaping, participation in neighborhood activities, and
duration and stability of ownership. All of these conditions demand in-
volvement by homeowners and they all add to the value of mobilehomes
in place. The homeowner has an equity interest in the estate. Indeed, a
Los Angeles study found that the investment of the average mobilehome
owner in his home is triple the investment of the park owner in the space
on which the home resides.47
California's determination of property interests was both reasonable
and appropriate.
Property rights serve human values. They are recognized to
that end, and are limited by it. Title to real property cannot
include dominion over the destiny of persons the owner permits
to come upon the premises.
State v. Shack, 277 A.2d at 372 (emphasis added).
B. The Escondido Ordinance, Consistent With State Law, Protects the
Mobilehome Owner's State-Defined Property Right While Guaran-
teeing the Park Owner a Reasonable Return on Its Investment.
Although State law does not explicitly impose any limit on the
amount of rent the park owner can demand from the new homeowner, a
limit to some reasonable amount is necessarily implicit in the 1975 provi-
sion requiring park owners to accept a qualified purchaser. The provi-
sion would be a nullity if a park owner could approve prospective
tenants only on condition that they pay a prohibitively high rent (a rent,
for example, that would only be affordable if the price of the mobilehome
had dropped to salvage value). Escondido's Ordinance implements the
homeowner's state-recognized property right by limiting the required
rent to a "just, fair, and reasonable" amount. Escondido Municipal
Code § 29-104(g) (see Joint Appendix ("J.A.") at 25).
1. Escondido's Vacancy Control Ordinance Is a Logical Ex-
tension of State Law.
The aim of the Escondido Ordinance's vacancy control provision, as
well as the ordinances of numerous other local governments in California
and elsewhere,48 is to protect mobilehome values from decline by limiting
47. City of Los Angeles Rent Stabilization Division, Community Development Depart-
ment, Mobilehome Parks Under Rent Stabilization (1985) at 11, 33.
48. Local governments throughout California have instituted mobilehome rent control,
even where they do not have apartment rent control. These governments repeatedly cite the
scarcity of mobilehome pad vacancies, the difficulty and cost of moving a mobilehome, and the
ability of park owners to take advantage of this situation as the reason for implementing rent
June 1992] 1277
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
the rental prices park owners can exact from new buyers. An unlimited
power to drive rents up is an unlimited power to drive mobilehome prices
down-until they reach scrap or salvage value, which is virtually nil even
for the most expensive homes.49
Petitioners' claim that exorbitant rent increases are unlikely because
park owners have no incentive to "deter listings and sales" is flatly
wrong. (Brief, at 29.) Park owners have every incentive to deter sales
and listings-to everyone but themselves. That is exactly what they have
done; indeed, that is the power they claim. Arguing in their brief before
the Court of Appeal, petitioners stated that without rent control, "the
landlord could raise the rent to prohibitive levels and as a practical mat-
ter has both the right and the power to compel the removal of the ten-
ant." Appellants' Opening Brief at 1.
The history of California's mobilehome park legislation shows that
park owners have used their power over eviction, over access to land, and
over future rents, to position themselves as the sole agents for, or buyers
of, mobilehomes that are for sale in their parks." Over fifty mobilehome
owners in Salinas, California complained that park owners improperly
rejected prospective buyers. Several homeowners reported that after
they were unable to sell their homes to an outside buyer, the park owner
bought the homes at below market value and then sold the homes at a
profit.51
Unless a seller can guarantee his buyer that the mobilehome will not
have to be removed from the premises, that the buyer will be accepted as
a park resident, and that the buyer will be protected against prohibitive
entry fees, transfer fees, and rents when he moves in, a homeowner has
no way to protect his investment in the home. This is true whether or
not the law prohibits the sale of the home to the park owner. Even where
park owners do not engage in abusive rent practices, large increases in
rent decrease the value of the mobilehome, and threaten the equity in-
vestment of the homeowner. The prospect of continued, unpredictable
control. See, eg., Chula Vista Municipal Code § 16.16.010; Morgan Hill Municipal Code
§ 5.36.010; Laguna Beach Municipal Code § 1.12.010; City of Fresno Ordinance No. 87-170;
Salinas Municipal Code § 17.1-1. The Escondido Ordinance is similar to many of these other
laws. J.A. at 21.
49. "Mobile Home Parks and Connecticut's Regulatory Scheme," supra note 23 at 815
and n.19.
50. See supra notes 29 and 33 and accompanying text.
51. Survey of Mobile Homeowners in Salinas, Legal Services for Seniors, Salinas, California
(1990) at 3. See also "Judge Hammers Landlord's Attorney for $25K," Santa Barbara In-
dependent (April 11, 1991) at 11 (indicating that park owner at one mobilehome park pro-
posed rental increase of 100 percent-from $300 to $600).
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rent increases can make a mobilehome unmarketable.5 2 Unlike ordinary
landlords, park owners need not worry about sluggish sales or vacancies.
The mobilehomes remain on the land; no matter how long it takes to sell
them, and whether they are occupied or vacant, homeowners must con-
tinue to pay rent to the park owners.
Moreover, steady increases in rent above the consumer price index
can have significant adverse impacts on current mobilehome owners-
especially older homeowners on fixed income-regardless of their impact
on the value of the home. Cities throughout California have reported
large rent increases in recent years.53 For homeowners living on fixed
incomes, rent increases above the consumer price index quickly exceed
their financial resources.
The Escondido Ordinance is one important element in the long-
standing effort to secure the property right of mobilehome owners in the
value of their homes. The Ordinance simply implements State law on a
local level by ensuring that park owners cannot circumvent the purpose
behind the State law by charging exorbitant rents to prospective tenants.
Without this protection, park owners could reject all new homeowners
through rent increases.
2. The Escondido Ordinance Does Not "Unreasonably Impair"
the Park Owner's Right to the Use of Its Property.
In implementing the homeowner's property right, the Escondido
Ordinance protects the park owner's right against unreasonable impair-
ment (PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 83) by providing for a reasonable return
on investment, which is all that the Constitution demands. Duquesne
Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 305, 310 (1989). The Escondido Or-
dinance makes no ipse dixit reversal of a usual and general property rule,
Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, 449 U.S. at 164, for it merely imposes rent
control, a permitted limitation on landowners since 1921. Block v.
Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135 (1921); Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1
(1988).
52. Manufactured Housing for Families, supra note 12 at 14.
53. Rents in petitioners' parks increased by 28-30 percent between 1986 and 1988; the
consumer price index during that time rose by only 7.5 percent. U.S. Department of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index, San Diego, California (August 15, 1991) at
1. See also Baar, Mobile Home Ownership in Fremont (1991) at 11 (in one example rents
increased by 354 percent between 1972 and 1991, while consumer price index during that same
time rose by only 242 percent); Survey of Mobile Homeowners in Salinas, supra note 51 at 1
(indicating that average annual rents increased at two to three times the consumer price in-
dex). Generally, rental housing prices increase at only 65 percent of the consumer price index.
Id.
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Nor can park owners claim the ordinance deprives them of a reason-
able investment-backed expectation. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444
U.S. 164, 175 (1979). Any, of the devices by which park owners could
drive mobilehome prices down to salvage value, such as the power to
evict, remove, deny qualified successors, or charge excessive rents, are
not constitutionally protected property interests. Petitioners' economic
interest is derived from two forms of monopoly power: one resulting
from the scarcity of land available for mobilehome park development and
the other gained as a result of the homeowner's sunk investment in his
home. "No one has a legitimate claim of entitlement to monopoly prof-
its." Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 799
F.2d 317, 327 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J.). The State has deter-
mined that this power to exploit does not represent a property interest of
the park owner.
M. CALIFORNIA'S LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO THE DEFI-
NITIONAL PROBLEM POSED BY MOBILEHOME OWN-
ERSHIP IS ENTIRELY CONSISTENT WITH THE
RESPONSE OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS TO SITUATIONS
OF DIVIDED OWNERSHIPS.
When new forms of divided ownership have appeared, the states
have had to define property rights appropriate to the circumstances.
Condominium ownership is the most familiar example. It raises an
analogous problem to that of the mobilehome owner and park owner and
it has generated similar rules. While a condominium association is not a
landlord seeking rent, it can and does have interests distinct from those
of a single homeowner, and it also has economic power because of the
sunk investment of the homeowner. When a condominium owner wishes
to sell his unit and is subject to the approval of the condominium board,
courts hold that the necessary approval may not be withheld except upon
reasonable grounds, such as the financial capacity of the buyer.54 Where
the board is allowed to exercise a right of refusal, it is obliged to provide
a buyer at an equally favorable price. Chianese v. Culley, 397 F. Supp.
1344 (S.D.Fl. 1975). The board cannot use its powers of refusal to de-
value, or capture for itself, the value of the condominium unit.
Another analogous situation arose in Hawaii, where large landown-
ers refused to sell land and required that homes be sited on their land
under lease. The state enacted a land condemnation plan whereby the
54. See, eg., Aquarian Foundation, Inc v. Sholom House, Inc., 448 So.2d 1166 (Fla. Ct.
App., 1984); Laguna Royale Owners Association v. Darger, 119 Cal. App. 3d 670 (1981).
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underlying land was acquired from landowners at fair market value and
resold to homeowners. Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S.
229, 234 n.2 (1984). The novel question for the state then was what part
of the total, in a split estate, belonged to the landowner, and what part to
the homeowner. Id. at 244. Under Hawaii law, the landowner is not
entitled to everything that its power position would have allowed it to
capture in a scarce marketplace; instead, Hawaii attributed to the home-
owner the value of his property investment by way of his improvements
and enhancements of both the lot and the neighborhood. Hawaii Rev.
Stat. Ann. Title 28 § 516-1 (Supp. 1989) (defining "owner's basis").
Both the United States and England faced a similar problem that
grew out of landowner practices in the Nineteenth Century. In England,
many landowners refused to sell their land, and homeowners were
obliged to build their homes on another's land under 99 year leases. As
those leases reached termination in the Twentieth Century, homeowners
were threatened with having to "remove" their buildings, which effec-
tively meant selling to the landowners at scrap value. Parliament re-
sponded with legislation permitting the homeowners either a 50-year
lease extension, or a right to purchase the underlying land, at govern-
mentally-approved prices, rather than the price the landowner could
have exacted as a result of the homeowner's sunk investment. The pur-
pose, and result, of the legislation was to protect the homeowner's in-
vestment value against landlord economic power. 5
In some American states, statutes granted lessees with similar long
term leases a non-waivable right to buy the underlying property in fee.
The statute set a reasonable price for the property, although it was a
lower price than the landlord could exact as a result of his economic
power over the homeowner. The American law, recognizing the home-
owner's right to realize the investment value of his home in place, set a
maximum price the landlord could demand. Stewart v. Gorter, 16 A. 644
(Md. 1889).56
As the preceding examples show, jurisdictions have followed vari-
ous approaches in determining the incidents belonging to each of the co-
proprietors. In each case, the jurisdiction has diminished the economic
power of the unregulated landowner in favor of the homeowner, while
55. Leasehold Reform in England and Wales, presented to Parliament by the Minister of
Land and Natural Resources by Command of Her Majesty (H.M.S.O., Feb., 1966) at 4-5,
describing the proposal that became the Leasehold Reform Act of 1967, section 1(1); Hals-
bury's Laws of England, Vol. 27 1001, 4th Ed. (Butterworths 1981 & Supp. 1990).
56. See also 16 U.S.C. § 20e (West 1991) (United States must compensate companies oper-
ating businesses in National Parks for loss of their structures if government terminates their
concession contract).
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guaranteeing it a just, fair, and reasonable return on investment. Califor-
nia and Escondido have done no more through their recognition of the
property rights of the mobilehome owner and the park owner.57
IV. ESCONDIDO'S VACANCY CONTROL ORDINANCE SAT-
ISFIES THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS DE-
MANDED OF REGULATORY ENACTMENTS.
Although this is a definition of property case, the Escondido Ordi-
nance plainly survives scrutiny under this Court's regulatory taking stan-
dards. There is a legitimate interest in protecting homeowner values; the
state may define homeowner values to include locational value, as well as
investment and improvement value over and above salvage value. More-
over, homeowner values are and have been diminished by the behavior of
park owners; there is thus a nexus between the harm caused by park
owners and the remedy that both the state legislation and local ordinance
have fashioned.
The remedy that the State and City of Escondido have chosen, af-
fording homeowners locational value by means of statutorily-created
rights of tenure and transfer in location, and by limiting charges that
could thwart realization of those rights, is tightly fitted to the harm.58
Indeed, the remedy achieves precisely the purpose of mobilehome policy;
the intended beneficiaries of the law are in fact benefitted-both incum-
bent and future owners-in the form of stabilized home values and op-
portunities to accrue enhancement value upon sale. Insofar as certain
beneficiaries (incumbent homeowners) realize an additional benefit, that
is a necessary and inevitable result of new laws and legal interpretations,
whether they result from legislation or from judicial decision.
57. California's approach to the split ownership situation is similar to the approach taken
throughout the United States. Many states require that park owners give homeowners renewa-
ble leases. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 140 § 323 (West 1979 & Supp. 1991); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit.
10, § 6237 (Equity 1984 & Supp. 1991); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 68 § 398.3 (West 1984 & Supp.
1991). Three other states permit a selling homeowner to transfer his lease to the purchasing
homeowner and prohibit the park owner from rejecting the purchaser except for an inability to
pay rent, refusal to follow park rules, or evidence of illegal use of the mobilehome. Mass. Gen.
Laws Ann. ch. 140 § 32M (West 1979); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 6240 (Equity 1984 & Supp.
1991); R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-44-4(0 (Michie 1982 & Supp. 1991).
58. The alternative suggested by petitioners is no alternative at all. (Brief, at 29.) They
simply propose the repeal of vacancy control laws, which would defeat the precise and legiti-
mate purpose that the Escondido Ordinance seeks to achieve.
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A. Contrary to Petitioners' Claim, Escondido's Vacancy Control Ordi-
nance Confers Substantial Advantages Upon Successor
Homeowners.
Petitioners argue that successor mobilehome owners obtain no bene-
fit from the law, suggesting that all the benefit is captured and carried
away by the incumbent homeowner-seller. (Brief, at 23-24.) This con-
tention is erroneous.
Even if the sales price of mobilehomes were to rise immediately after
the imposition of vacancy control, there would be substantial benefits to
each new generation of buyers.5 9 Where new owners improve and main-
tain their mobilehomes, or enhance the quality of the neighborhood, they
will be able to realize the increased value of their home and its environs
when they sell. If new residents could not assure their buyers, in turn,
the right to tenancy at a controlled price, the park owner would be able
to capture such added value over and above the value of the home when
the homeowner bought it. The law thus assures homeowners the ability
to realize the benefits of what they put into the property when they de-
cide to sell.
The law also frees purchasing homeowners from instability arising
from strategic behavior on the part of the park owner. Park owners
sometimes underprice the rental amount for a pad for their own reasons
(for example, they may seek to ward off additional government regula-
tion of their industry).' Insofar as home prices and rentals are comple-
mentary, home prices will rise during such a period. One who buys
during a period of rental underpricing will pay a higher home price.
Later, when it comes time to sell, park owners may be charging maxi-
mum rents and home prices will then fall. The homeowner caught in
such circumstances will have bought high, but have to sell low. While
home prices always vary to some extent with market conditions, most
homeowners are not forced into a speculative market, where-in order to
invest wisely in their homes-they must be skillful guessers about land-
lord pricing and turnover strategies. In the absence of vacancy control,
park owners have an incentive to promote turnover in tenancies, which
in turn promotes instability. Vacancy control laws reduce speculative
risk and import stability into the mobilehome market.
59. Some buyers will find that mobilehome prices do not rise automatically to absorb the
economic value of vacancy control. Where mobilehome sales are sluggish, eager sellers may
keep prices down to attract buyers quickly. Nor are people always rational maximizers. In
such cases, buyers will benefit from controlled rental prices.
60. Hirsch and Hirsch, supra note 22 at 445.
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B. The So-Called Windfall to Incumbent Homeowners Is a Common
Benefit Enjoyed by All Incumbents When Government Creates or
Redefines Property Rights.
The fact that homeowners in place at the time of the law's enact-
ment receive a special benefit is inevitable and constitutionally irrelevant.
(Brief, at 25-28.) When a law changes or creates new rights, incumbent
owners obtain an additional benefit beyond what their successors get,
simply because they are in place at the time of the law's enactment.
For example, owners of property along the California coast who
bought their land at a cost reflecting the prospect of a beach access ease-
ment received a windfall because they were in place when this Court
invalidated a similar easement in Nollan v. California Coastal Commis-
sion, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). Their property values would rise to reflect the
economic value of the new legal rule. When they sell their properties,
they will reap the capitalized value of that change.
As property rules inevitably change, or as new technology results in
new property interests, incumbent owners who are in the right place at
the right time reap a special gain from the change. See e.g., Oregon ex
rel. State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363
(1977) (overruling property rule of Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S.
313 (1973)).
V. THE ESCONDIDO VACANCY CONTROL ORDINANCE
DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A PHYSICAL INVASION TAKING
UNDER THE LORETTO DOCTRINE.
A. The Escondido Ordinance Does No More To Transfer a Pos-
sessory Interest in Property Than Do Any of the State
Provisions.
The claim that the Escondido Ordinance in conjunction with the
California Mobilehome Residency Law is a taking of a "possessory inter-
est in the realty" of the park owner sweeps extraordinarily broadly.
(Brief, at 14.) Each of the State law protections, enacted over twenty
years, creates in the mobilehome owner a present possessory interest in
the realty of the park owner, an interest the homeowner did not have by
lease or contract. Each provision empowers the homeowner to exercise
those rights at a price below that at which the park owner would have
voluntarily granted such rights. Unless it is assumed that park owners
could have thwarted all those laws by charging some exorbitant rent as a
condition of their exercise, the Escondido Ordinance no more constitutes
a taking within the meaning of Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV
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Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), than do any of the State laws. All the Escon-
dido Ordinance adds is the right of a purchasing homeowner to pay the
same rent for the space as the seller, while still allowing a reasonable
return to the park owner.
It is true that not all the State laws relate to the sale of the
mobilehome on-site. Some rights under the State law, such as the protec-
tion against eviction, are vested in the incumbent resident. But there is
no rational basis for distinguishing, as a matter of constitutional taking
doctrine, between a right to sell the mobilehome to another and the right
to have one's own tenancy extended. In each case, the purpose of the
State law is to protect the investment value of the mobilehome against
the efforts of the park owner to drive down the price of the home to
salvage value. That concern is identical whether the owner remains, sub-
leases, or sells.
The right to occupy land permanently is indeed something that Cali-
fornia law gives to mobilehome owners and that must be given if
mobilehome value is to be protected at all. For where there is nowhere
to move such homes, an order to move is effectively an order to turn the
home over to the park owner at its salvage value. The right to occupy
land at less than the rent the park owner chooses to charge is equally
necessary to protect against the park owner's capacity either to appropri-
ate the home for himself or to charge rents that render the mobilehome
worthless. The right granted the mobilehome owner to "market" the
right of occupancy is simply a grant to the homeowner of the right to
alienate his property.
Insofar as these rights are, in part at least, rights that ordinary ten-
ants do not have, the answer is that mobilehome owners are not ordinary
tenants. They are co-proprietors. To characterize them merely as ten-
ants is not only to slight the authority of the State to give definition to
property rights under novel circumstances, it is to give no constitutional
weight to the needs of a homeowner whose home is sited on the land of
another as a matter of economic necessity.
B. The Crucial Element in Loretto Was the Absence of a Voluntary
Opening of the Property to Possessory Use by Others.
Nothing in Loretto or any other physical invasion case compels or
even suggests the result urged on this Court by petitioners and their sup-
porters. The crucial distinction between this case and Loretto is the pres-
ence here of a voluntary act on the part of the park owner opening his
property to the possession of others. That act may come in the form of
property that has been opened to the general public, Prune Yard Shopping
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Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, or property that is occupied under a con-
tractual relationship between the landowner and the persons on whose
behalf the challenged law has been invoked. FCC v. Florida Power Corp.,
480 U.S. 245 (1987).
Where there is no such voluntary act, a landowner is entitled to be
left to the exclusive possession, peace and quiet, and privacy that is a
central element of a property right.61 United States v. Causby, 328 U.S.
256; Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825. Where a
landowner has opened private land only to those who pay (who have a
contractual relationship with him), the state cannot compel him to con-
vert it to a public facility, opening it also to those who do not pay. Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164. Fred F French Inv. Co. v. City of
New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381 (1976). But a property owner
who has entered into a contractual relationship with another to possess
his land cannot claim the right to dictate the terms of that relationship
free of all government regulation, and subject only to the bargained-upon
terms that unconstrained bargaining would produce between the parties.
Such a result would constitute a throwback to the discredited doctrine of
freedom of contract articulated in Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915)
and Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 267 U.S. 525 (1923).
Any extension of Loretto to invalidate regulation of contractual pos-
sessory relationships would make all sorts of conventional regulation
constitutionally suspect as takings. Even if a rule were limited to some
notion of a "marketable" possessory right it would be very far-reaching.
Laws recognizing rights to sublease or to assign a lease would be vulnera-
ble as takings, since such rights compel the landowner to accept an im-
posed new tenant at a set price. In fact, unreasonable withholding of
permission to sublease can be an illegal restraint on alienation.62 This is
the sort of prospect the Court recognized when in FCC v. Florida Power
Corp., 480 U.S. at 252, it drew a distinction between voluntarily initiated
"invitations" and those that are imposed by government. "[lit is the in-
vitation.., that makes the difference."
CONCLUSION
There are no factual disputes in this case which merit a trial. Amici
61. Unlike Loretto, where the owner had not consented to the invasion of his property by
the Teleprompter cable, here the only physical objects on the park owner's property are
mobilehomes to which the park owner has no objection. Indeed it is in consequence of such
"invasions" that he makes his living.
62. New York Real Prop. Law, § 226-b (West 1989 & Supp. 1991); Restatement (Second)
of Property, § 15.2(2) (1977 & Supp. 1991).
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do not disagree with the economic theory that motivates petitioners' ac-
tion: mobilehome prices and rents are complementary. The fact that
mobilehome prices increase when rents are controlled, however, does not
deprive park owners of any constitutionally protected interest. More-
over, it is precisely this relationship that makes controlling rents a ra-
tional response to the need to protect mobilehome owners' equity
investment in their homes.
Because most mobilehomes in reality must be occupied on the land
of another, the formulaic rule urged by the petitioners-no sale of the
right to occupy the land of another-would deny mobilehome owners
any claim to their property rights. Neither Loretto nor any other case
decided by this Court calls for such an outcome. Even accepting every
allegation in petitioners' complaint as true, the Escondido Ordinance
does not violate any of petitioners' constitutional rights.
For all of the reasons stated herein, amici respectfully request that
this Court affirm the decision of the California Court of Appeal.
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